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“Send me a bill that gives every worker in America the opportunity to earn seven days of paid
sick leave. It’s the right thing to do. It’s the right thing to do.”
Barack Obama
in his State of the Union Address (January 20, 2015)
“I think the Republicans would be smart to get behind it.”
Bill O’Reilly
in The O’Reilly Factor – Fox News (January 21, 2015)
A major economic justification f o r p u blicly p r ovided a c cess t o p a id s i ck l e ave i s presenteeism
and negative externalities in case of contagious diseases. When workers lack access to paid sick
leave, they may go to work despite being sick. Going to work despite being sick is commonly referred to as “presenteeism.” Particularly in professions with direct customer contact, presenteeism in
case of contagious diseases unambiguously leads to negative externalities and infection spillovers for
co-workers and customers. Given the low influenza vaccination rates of around 40 percent in the U.S.
and 10–30 percent in the EU (Blank et al. 2009; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2014a),
workplace presenteeism is one important channel through which infectious diseases spread. After
the first occurrence of flu sickness symptoms, humans are contagious for 5–7 days (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2014b). Over-the-counter (OTC) drugs that suppress symptoms, but
not contagiousness, promote the spread of disease in cases of presenteeism and noninsured workplace absenteeism (Earn et al. 2014). Worldwide, seasonal influenza epidemics alone lead to 3–5
million severe illnesses and an estimated 250,000–500,000 deaths; in the U.S., flu-associated annual
deaths range from 3,000 to 49,000 (World Health Organization 2014; Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2014b).
Historically, paid sick leave was actually one of the first social insurance pillars worldwide; this
policy was included in the first federal health insurance legislation. Under Otto van Bismarck, the
Sickness Insurance Law of 1883 introduced social health insurance, which included 13 weeks of paid
sick leave along with coverage for medical bills. The costs associated with paid sick leave initially
made up more than half of all program costs, given the limited availability of expensive medical
treatments in the nineteenth century (Busse and Riesberg 2004). Other European countries followed
quickly, and today, virtually every European country has some form of universal access to paid sick
leave—with varying degrees of generosity.
Opponents of universal paid sick leave point to the fact that such social insurance systems would
encourage shirking behavior and reduce labor supply. Moreover, forcing employers to provide sick
pay via mandates or new taxes would dampen job creation and hurt employment. A final argument
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against government-mandated paid sick leave states that, when coverage is optimal, the private market would ensure that employers voluntarily provide such benefits.
The United States is the only industrialized country worldwide without universal access to paid
sick leave (Heymann et al. 2009). Half of all American employees have no access to paid sick leave,
particularly low-income and service sector workers (Lovell 2003; Boots et al. 2009; Susser and
Ziebarth 2015). However, support for sick leave mandates in the United States has grown
substantially in the last decade. On the city level, sick leave schemes have been implemented in San
Francisco, Washington D.C., Seattle, Philadelphia, and New York City, among other cities. On the
state level, Connecticut was the first state to introduce a sick leave scheme in 2012 (for service sector
workers in non-small businesses). California, Massachusetts, and Oregon followed in 2015. At the
federal level, reintroduced in Congress in March 2013, the Healthy Families Act foresees the
introduction of universal paid sick leave for up to seven days per employee and year. The epigraphs
above clearly demonstrate the support among Democrats and conservatives alike.
As discussed, one economic argument for paid sick leave hinges crucially on the existence of negative externalities and presenteeism with regard to contagious diseases. Despite being of tremendous
relevance, empirically proving the existence of presenteeism with contagious diseases is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, because contagiousness is generally unobservable. Several empirical papers evaluate the causal effects of cuts in sick pay and find that employees adjust their labor supply
in response to such cuts (Johansson and Palme 1996, 2005; Ziebarth and Karlsson 2010; De Paola et al.
2014; Ziebarth and Karlsson 2014; Dale-Olsen 2014; Fevang et al. 2014).1 Traditionally, behavioral adjustments to varying levels of insurance generosity is labeled “moral hazard” in economics (Pauly
1974, 1983; Arnott and Stiglitz 1991; Nyman 1999; Newhouse 2006; Felder 2008; Bhattacharya and
Packalen 2012). However, in the case of sick leave, being able to disentangle shirking behavior from
presenteeism is crucial in order to derive valid policy conclusions.
The main objective of this paper is to decompose moral hazard and develop an approach to (indirectly) test for the existence of shirking, contagious presenteeism, and associated negative externalities in workplace settings under sickness insurance coverage. To our knowledge, this paper is
the first in the economic literature to define and test for the existence of contagious presenteeism.
Although related and sometimes combined in laws, sick pay schemes differ crucially from maternity
1 Other papers in the literature on sickness absence looked at and decomposed general determinants (Barmby et al. 1994;
Markussen et al. 2011), investigated the impact of probation periods (Riphahn 2004; Ichino and Riphahn 2005), culture
(Ichino and Maggi 2000), gender (Ichino and Moretti 2009; Gilleskie 2010), income taxes (Dale-Olsen 2013), and unemployment (Askildsen et al. 2005; Nordberg and Røed 2009; Pichler 2015). There is also research on the impact of sickness on
earnings (Sandy and Elliott 2005; Markussen 2012).
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leave schemes (Gruber 1994; Ruhm 1998; Waldfogel 1998; Rossin-Slater et al. 2013; Lalive et al. 2014;
Carneiro et al. 2015; Thomas 2015) due to the negative externalities induced by contagious presenteeism in combination with information asymmetries between employers and employees about the
type and extent of the employee’s disease. One key element of the proposed theoretical mechanism is
private information about the type of disease that workers contract. Supported by intuition and empirical evidence (Pauly et al. 2008), employers have only incomplete information about employees’
contagiousness and do not fully internalize the negative externalities induced by the spread of contagious diseases to coworkers and customers. Sick pay schemes incentivize contagious employees to
stay at home but also induce noncontagious employees to shirk.
Accordingly, the first part of the paper develops an economic model that decomposes moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism. According to our theoretical framework, the negative
externalities can be quantified by assessing changes in infections after changes in sick pay. The model
predicts that changes in sick pay generosity induce changes in the two undesired behaviors that work
in opposite directions: shirking and contagious presenteeism. We explicitly refrain from a normative
welfare analysis, which would require to weight these two phenomena, depending on societal preferences. Rather, we provide a positive analysis and the first approach to theoretically define and
empirically measure these countervailing effects. Note that the theory and empirical sections do not
hinge on whether the sick pay scheme is mandated by the government.
The second part of the paper exploits two German policy reforms that varied the level of sick pay.
Using administrative data aggregated at the industry level and variation in industry-specific sick
pay regulations, sick pay cuts from 100 to 80 percent of foregone wages reduced overall sickness rates
by about 20 percent. This is in line with the standard predictions of our model and the previous
literature (Johansson and Palme 1996, 2005; Ziebarth and Karlsson 2010; De Paola et al. 2014;
Ziebarth and Karlsson 2014; Fevang et al. 2014). Next, and more importantly, we analyze the labor
supply effects by certified disease categories. In line with the theoretical model implications, we find
disproportionately large labor supply adjustments for musculoskeletal diseases (“back pain”).
Meanwhile, the labor supply adjustments in case of infectious diseases are significantly s maller.
According to our model, the differences between the small labor supply effects for contagious
diseases and the large labor supply effects for noncontagious diseases are a function of additional
infections due to contagious presenteeism. Additional infections increase sick leave rates of
infectious diseases and countervail decreases due to lower sick pay. Thus, when mandated sick pay
is lowered, policymakers have to
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consider the trade-off between the short-run effect of a reduction in shirking vs. an increase in contagious presenteeism leading to a higher infection rate and more relapses in the medium-run.
The third part of the paper utilizes high-frequency Google Flu data to evaluate the impact of U.S.
sick pay schemes on influenza rates. The staggered implementation of several sick pay schemes at
the regional level in the United States naturally leads to the estimation of standard difference-indifferences models. Although the U.S. sick pay schemes vary in their comprehensiveness, and some
have exemptions reducing the effectiveness of lowering infection rates, we can show the following:
When U.S. employees gain access to paid sick leave, the general flu rate in the population decreases
by about 10 percent. This finding yields additional strong evidence for the existence of contagious
presenteeism. Moreover, it shows that a reduction in contagious presenteeism occurs when sick pay
coverage increases, resulting in fewer infections and lower influenza activity. This paper is one of the
first to study the introduction of sick pay mandates in the United States (Ahn and Yelowitz 2015, is
one exception). In addition, it is one of the first economic papers to exploit high-frequency data from
Google Flu Trends, a rich data set that assesses influenza activity on a weekly basis starting in 2003.
Obviously, this paper is close in spirit to papers that estimate causal labor supply effects of
changes in sick pay levels (Johansson and Palme 1996, 2002, 2005; Ziebarth 2013; Ziebarth and Karlsson 2010, 2014). However, none of these papers estimates labor supply effects by disease groups. In
particular, this paper extends the small economic literature on presenteeism at the workplace (Aronsson et al. 2000; Chatterji and Tilley 2002; Brown and Sessions 2004; Pauly et al. 2008; Barmby and
Larguem 2009; Johns 2010; Böckerman and Laukkanen 2010; Markussen et al. 2012; Pichler 2015;
Hirsch et al. 2015; Ahn and Yelowitz 2015). With one exception, none of the empirical studies on
presenteeism just cited identifies or intends to identify causal effects of sick leave schemes on presenteeism. The exception is Markussen et al. (2012) who study the impact of partial absence certificates
on what they label “presenteeism.” However, they define presenteeism very broadly—as a general
increase in labor supply when activation requirements become tighter. Pauly et al. (2008) ask 800
U.S. managers about their views on employee presenteeism with chronic and acute diseases. Pichler
(2015) provides evidence for the hypothesis that presenteeism is procyclical due to a higher workload during economic booms. Barmby and Larguem (2009) exploit daily absence data from a single
employer and estimate absence determinants as well as transmission rates of contagious diseases,
linking the estimation approach nicely to an economic model of absence behavior.
Finally, this paper also adds to the literature on the determinants and consequences of epidemics
and vaccinations (Mullahy 1999; Bruine de Bruin et al. 2011; Uscher-Pines et al. 2011; Ahn and Trog-
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don 2015). For example, Maurer (2009) models supply and demand side factors of influenza immunization, whereas Karlsson et al. (2014) empirically assess the impact of the 1918 Spanish Flu on
economic performance in Sweden.
The next section discusses our economic model and derives testable conditions under presenteeism and contagious diseases. The section after that first explains the German policy reforms to be
studied and the data used, and the the empirical approach leads to the estimation of the theoretical
model. The next section follows this structure for the United States, and the last section concludes.

Identifying Contagious Presenteeism and Negative Externalities
Modeling Shirking and Contagious Presenteeism Behavior
We extend and build upon a mix of standard work-leisure models to theoretically study the absence
behavior of workers (Brown 1994; Barmby et al. 1994; Brown and Sessions 1996; Gilleskie 1998).
While additional arguments for or against the provision of sick pay exist, our model focuses on the
trade-off between shirking and presenteeism behavior and negative externalities in form of infections
resulting from information asymmetries.2 Since we construct a model of individual behavior we omit
the i subscript in order to simplify notation. We specify the individual utility function as

(1)

ut = (1 − σt )ct + σt lt ,

with σt ∈ [0, 1] ,

where ut represents the utility of a worker at time t, ct stands for consumption, and lt for leisure.
The current sickness level is σt , with larger values of σt representing a higher degree of sickness.
Importantly, this parameter is private information of the worker and unknown by the firm.
In time periods with high levels of σt , i.e., when the worker is very sick, utility is mostly drawn
from leisure or recuperation time rather than consumption. On the other hand, if the sickness level
is relatively low, the worker attaches more weight to consumption as opposed to leisure.3
2 In particular, we abstain from modeling the employer’s side and effects on the firm level. This could include employer
signaling (or adverse selection) effects, peer effects, or discrimination against identifiable unhealthy workers (e.g., obese
workers). We also abstain from analyzing general equilibrium labor market effects.
3 While our model focuses on sickness and sickness absence, in principle a high σ only indicates a temporary preference
t
for leisure. This might not necessarily be related to sickness and associated recuperation time, but also to other factors,
such as sickness of family members and recreational activities.
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With h defining hours of contracted work and T the total amount of time available—and assuming
that workers are not saving but consuming their entire income from work wt or sick pay st —one can
write the indifference condition between working and (sickness) absence formally as

(2)

(1 − σt )st + σt T = (1 − σt )wt + σt ( T − h).

In most countries sick pay is not a flat monetary amount but rather a replacement rate of the
current wage. Hence we substitute sick pay with st = αt wt in the equation above (with αt ∈ [0, 1]).4
Moreover, workers are paid based on their average productivity and, approximating reality, we assume rigid wages and thus a time invariant wage level w. We can then calculate the indifference
point σ∗ (αt ) for a given replacement rate αt

(3)

σ∗ (αt ) =

(1 − α t ) w
.
(1 − α t ) w + h

Hence if σt > σ∗(αt) workers will be absent, while they will be present if σt < σ∗(αt). The latter can be
thought of the “normal” state under which the great majority, 80–90 percent of all workers, fall every
day. The value of σ∗(αt) where workers are indifferent solely depends on (i) the amount of money
workers lose while on sick leave, (1 − αt)w, and (ii) the contracted amount of working hours h.

Two Types of Diseases and Negative Externalities Due to Contagious Presenteeism
Next, let us assume that two types of (mutually exclusive) diseases exist: 1) contagious diseases
denoted by subscript c, e.g., flus and 2) noncontagious diseases denoted by subscript n, e.g., back
pain.5 More precisely, we assume that at every point in time there exist three fractions of workers: a
first share of workers, 1 − q − pt , who are healthy; a second share of workers, q, who are sick due to
a noncontagious disease, σt = σnt ; and a third share of workers, pt , who are sick due to a contagious
4 Notice that the wage may also include nonmonetary benefits, such as more job security. For instance, Scoppa and
Vuri (2014) find that workers who are absent more frequently face higher risks of dismissal. Thus even in countries with
nominally full replacement, in our model, this might translate to a replacement rate smaller than one due to future income
opportunities and other costs and benefits.
5 In principle, noncontagious diseases represent a special case of contagious diseases, where infections are equal to
zero. Moreover, (diseases with) relapses can also be considered as a special case of contagious diseases, where the level of
contagiousness is fairly low, as individuals “infect” only themselves.
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disease, σt = σct . In the latter two cases, the actual size of the disutility created by the sickness σt
is determined by the density function f (σ). Thus, whereas the level of σt determines the decision
of the worker to stay home or not, this additional characteristic determines whether the disease is
contagious.6
The share of workers being affected by a contagious disease, pt , changes over time depending on
infections in the previous period, as outlined below. On the other hand, the share of workers affected
by noncontagious diseases, q, is time invariant which is why we omit the time index t.7
As mentioned, importantly, both the severity of the disease and the “disease type” drawn by the
worker is private information and unobservable by the employer. This is an important, yet realistic,
assumption and drives the main mechanism below. It allows us to abstract away from a hypothetical
scenario where employers can unambiguously and always identify workers with contagious diseases and simply send them home to avoid infections. The private information assumption seems
reasonable given that disease type and contagiousness are mostly unobservable for the employer and
subject to very incomplete monitoring. Note that most infectious diseases are contagious for several
days before definite symptoms are observable. The availability and popularity of OTC drugs suppressing disease symptoms reinforce the unobservability assumption (Earn et al. 2014). Also note
that, for our model to work, it is not necessary to assume that employees know their disease type.
Given σ∗ (αt ) and assuming a worker population of size one, we can now define the sick leave
rate At as the share of individuals absent from work:

(4)

At = Act + Ant = ( pt + q)

Z1

σ∗ (α

f (σ )dσ;

t)

similarly, the share of workers present at work is given by

(5)

Pt = (1 − pt − q) + ( pt + q)

∗ (α )
σZ
t

f (σ)dσ.

0
6 We also assume that, conditional on being sick (σ > 0), the shares of disease types (p and q) are independent of the
t
density of the sickness level f (σ).
7 Note that we abstract away from any competing risks since an increase in contagious diseases does not affect the share
of individuals with a noncontagious disease. While substitution might take place, we assume it is of a small enough margin
not to be considered here.
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Given the replacement rate αt , a share of workers

πt (αt ) = pt

(6)

∗ (α )
σZ
t

f (σ)dσ

0

is contagious but present at work. We define πt (αt ) as contagious presenteeism. One economic purpose
of providing paid sick leave is to provide financial incentives for sick workers to call in sick, such that
infections caused by contagious presenteeism are minimized.
As seen, the share of workers with contagious presenteeism behavior who transmit diseases
to their coworkers and customers equals πt (αt ). Following a standard SIS (susceptible-infectedsusceptible) endemic model,8 the transmission of diseases via contagious presenteeism depends on
three factors: 1) the share of contagious workers working (the infected) πt , 2) the share of nonconσ∗R(αt )
tagious individuals who can be infected (the susceptibles) St = (1 − pt − q) + q
f (σ)dσ , and
0

3) the transmission rate of the disease which we denote with r.9 Therefore the share of individuals with contagious diseases is an increasing function of these three elements, formally pt (πt , St , r ).
Thus contagious workers who show up at the workplace trigger the negative externalities that sick
pay schemes intend to minimize.

Severely Sick Workers, Shirkers, and the Definition of Moral Hazard
If σt > σ∗ (0), workers are too sick to work and would stay home even if they had to completely forgo
wage (the replacement rate was zero). In this case, the utility function approximates ut = δσt lt . This
can be thought of as a state where people are either lying in bed with extremely high fever and heavy,
acute, flu symptoms (as an example for a contagious disease), or lying in bed after chemotherapy
because of cancer (as an example for a noncontagious disease). Empirically, one can estimate that
about 3-5 percent of all workers fall into this category on a given day.10
When employees gain access to sick pay (αt > 0), there will be a share of workers who call in sick
as a result of their sick pay (workers with σ∗ (αt ) < σt < σ∗ (0)). These individuals would go to work,
if there was no sick pay. However, because they have access to sick pay, it is rational for them to be
8 The

SIS model is the classic framework for mathematically analyzing contagious diseases and was first discussed in
the medical literature by Ross (1916) and Kermack and McKendrick (1927).
9 It is outside the scope of this paper to model the transmission rate of contagious diseases explicitly (Philipson 2000;
Barmby and Larguem 2009; Pichler 2015).
10 In Germany, on a given day, about 7 percent of the workforce are on sick leave (see the section titled “The Policy
Reforms of 1996 and 1999”.
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absent from work. In the domain of noncontagious diseases, we refer to these workers as shirkers.
The share of shirkers at any point in time and for a given sick pay replacement level αt equals

ω (αt ) = q

(7)

σZ∗ (0)

σ∗ (α

f (σ)dσ.

t)

As productivity is hard to measure in most settings, we do not model work productivity explicitly. However, for noncontagious diseases, lower productivity due to sickness mostly dominates
sickness absence and zero work output. Formally, denote with δ(σ∗ (0)) the sickness-related productivity losses for workers that are just indifferent between going to work and staying at home at
a replacement rate of zero. If worker utility and firm profits have similar weights, then as long as
σ∗ (0)αt w > δ(σ∗ (0)), work is preferred to sickness absence. This condition compares the consumption utility from sickness benefits with the productivity losses from a sick noncontagious worker.
Sickness absence is preferred from a societal point of view only if the productivity losses or consumption utility losses due to sickness are very large. For the rest of the paper we assume that
σ∗ (0)αt w > δ(σ∗ (0)), and thus working is preferred to sickness absence for noncontagious diseases,
as long as the disease is not too severe σt < σ∗ (0).
Finally, we define moral hazard as the sum of shirking individuals and individuals exhibiting
contagious presenteeism 11

ρ t ( α t ) = ω ( α t ) + π t ( α t ).

(8)

Proposition 1. Under a sick pay scheme and given the existence of contagious as well as noncontagious diseases, there exists a fraction of contagious workers πt who engage in presenteeism.
Contagious workers who go to work induce negative externalities because they infect coworkers and
customers. Likewise, there exists a fraction of noncontagious workers who shirk, ω. Moral hazard,
ρt , is the sum of shirking and presenteeism.
11 Similar

to Einav et al. (2013), moral hazard is strictly speaking not a hidden action in our context, since it is perfectly
observable whether an employee is present or not. It is rather hidden information that employees have about their personal
sickness level and their type of sickness.
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Contagious and noncontagious diseases differ in that the former lead to contagious presenteeism
and infections, increasing the probability of infections. This negative externality is one of the main
economic justifications for sick pay. The extent of the negative externality depends on the contagiousness of the disease. Therefore, in the context of our model, presenteeism is not harmful per se,
but rather the negative externalities triggered by contagious presenteeism.

Changes in Sick Pay and Moral Hazard: Intuitive and Graphical Representation
To simplify, we assume (without loss of generality) that sick pay is high in the base year (t = 0)
and is exogenously cut after one year in t = y1 . Deriving the indifference condition in equation (3)
yields

∂σ∗ (α)
∂α

< 0. This means that a decrease in the replacement rate—as induced by the first German

reform in 1996—increases σ∗ and thus more workers work, i.e., the sick leave rate decreases.
Following a sick pay cut, work attendance increases and sick leave decreases. However, what
is even more relevant is how contagious presenteeism and shirking behavior changes. It can easily
be shown that shirking decreases because σ∗ (αy1 ) > σ∗ (α0 ). Moreover, contagious presenteeism increases for the same reason. Thus it remains ambiguous what happens to overall moral hazard since
the first component of moral hazard, contagious presenteeism, increases while the second component, shirking, decreases.
Proposition 2. Given the existence of contagious as well as noncontagious diseases, a sick pay
cut increases contagious presenteeism, which induces negative externalities through infections of
coworkers and customers. At the same time, a sick pay cut reduces the fraction of shirkers. A priori,
the impact on moral hazard, defined as the sum of both behaviors, is ambiguous. Analogously, an
increase in sick pay decreases contagious presenteeism and increases shirking behavior.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of Proposition 2. Panel A depicts the situation for noncontagious diseases. Initially, the share of shirkers—indicated by the sum of the two dark gray areas—is
quite large. However, as sick pay decreases, more workers with noncontagious illnesses come to
work and the shirking rate decreases.
Panel B depicts the situation for contagious diseases. As sick pay decreases, contagious presenteeism increases, meaning more workers with contagious illnesses come to work. Because of addi-
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tional infections, the share of individuals with a contagious disease, pt , increases, as represented by
the outward shift of the density function.

Changes in Sick Pay and Moral Hazard: Analytical Derivation
An0 − Ant
An0

Noncontagious diseases.

= β nt denotes the percentage change in the sick leave rate of

noncontagious diseases, when sick pay decreases and after t time periods have passed. Thus β nt
represents the cumulative reform effect at time t, or formally


(9)

β nt =

1 
q
An0

Z1

f (σ)dσ − q

σ ∗ ( α0 )



Z1

σ∗ (αt )



1 

f (σ )dσ =
q
An0

∗ (α )
σZ
t



f (σ)dσ .

σ ∗ ( α0 )

In the case of noncontagious disease, the reduction in workplace absences is equal to the reduction
in shirking when sick pay decreases. Thus we can write

β nt =

(10)

Contagious diseases. Similarly

Ac0 − Act
Ac0

1
(ω (α0 ) − ω (αt )) .
An0

= β ct denotes the percentage change in the sick leave rate of

contagious diseases, when sick pay decreases and after t time periods.


β ct =

(11)

1 
 p0
Ac0

Z1

f (σ)dσ − pt

σ ∗ ( α0 )



Z1


f (σ)dσ .

σ∗ (αt )

This expression can be rewritten as


(12)

β ct =



1 

(π0 (αt ) − π0 (α0 )) − ( pt − p0 )
Ac0

Z1



f (σ)dσ ,

σ∗ (αt )

where the first element corresponds to the increase in contagious presenteeism due to the sick pay
cut (and the corresponding decrease in the absence rate)—related to the initial share of workers with
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a contagious disease, p0 . The second element corresponds to the increase in the absence rate due to
additional infections as a result of the increase in contagious presenteeism.
As described, additional infections increase the infection rate, pt . As seen in Proposition 2, more
contagious workers work after sick pay is cut. Furthermore, as more noncontagious workers work
as well, the number of susceptibles increases. Both effects result in more infections. Depending
on the magnitude of newly infected individuals, the increase in sickness absence due to infections
offsets the decrease due to additional contagious presenteeism, at least partly. For example, if—at
the firm level—one additional worker exhibits contagious presenteeism due to a sick pay cut, then
the net effect of the sick pay cut on the overall sick leave rate would be zero if this additional worker
infected one additional co-worker who then called in sick.
Next, we contrast the two offsetting behavioral forces, where β ct and β nt can be rewritten as:


β ct = β nt −

(13)

1 
 ( p t − p0 )
Ac0

Z1



f (σ)dσ .

σ∗ (αt )

Accordingly, the behavioral adjustments of the two disease groups, β ct and β nt , only differ by the
share of newly infected individuals weighted by the share of workers on sick leave prior to the sick
pay cut. Thus, under the existence of contagious presenteeism, it holds that β nt > β ct .
Finally, note that by definition, β nt > 0. However—in case of contagious diseases—the sign of β ct
is ambiguous. For a very contagious disease, β ct might become negative. Therefore the sign of β ct
remains an empirical question which will be assessed below.
Hypothesis 1 After a sick pay cut, the absence rate for noncontagious diseases (“shirking”) decreases (β nt > 0). The sign of the absence rate for contagious diseases, β ct , remains ambiguous
because additional absences due to new infections might outweigh the immediate decrease in the
absence rate due to the sick pay cut. The difference β nt − β ct indicates additional absences due to
new infections.
Finally, we denote the overall percentage change in the absence rate with β t =


(14)

βt =



1 

(ω (α0 ) − ω (αt )) + (π0 (αt ) − π0 (α0 )) − ( pt − p0 )
A0

Z1

σ∗ (αt )
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∆A
A0 :



f (σ)dσ .

The next subsection discusses how these effects can be empirically identified in order to quantify the
change in shirking and in new infections following a change in sick pay coverage.

Identifying Contagious Presenteeism and Negative Externalities Empirically
Using Disease-Specific Sick Leave Rates to Identify Contagious Presenteeism
Now assume data on sick leave behavior and sick pay schemes exist. Furthermore, assume a reform
exogenously varied sick pay and one can identify different groups of affected workers. Then we can
empirically estimate the causal effect of the change in sick pay on the share of workers who call in
sick. In the notation above, we thus empirically identify β t .
Moreover, assume that we could even empirically identify two different disease categories, c and
n, and the share of workers who call in sick with certified sickness due to contagious and noncontagious diseases. Then one could carry out a statistical test to check if β nt > β ct . In other words,
one could test if a sick-pay-cut induced decrease in sick leave is larger for disease categories, n as
compared to c, which would yield evidence for an increased spread of contagious diseases via an
increase in contagious presenteeism behavior.
Proposition 4a. Given the existence of a reform that exogenously varied sick pay and sick leave
data on differently affected employees, one can econometrically test if β t > 0, i.e., if the labor supply
adjustment with respect to a sick pay cut is positive and, if so, how large it is.
Proposition 4b. Given the availability of data for contagious and noncontagious sick leave rates,
one can estimate β nt and β ct . The size of β nt is informative for the relevance of shirking behavior. β ct
represents both the increase in contagious presenteeism and in additional sick leave due to infections
triggered by contagious presenteeism behavior.
Proposition 4c. Lastly, one can econometrically test if β nt > β ct (Hypothesis 1), i.e., whether the
labor supply adjustment is larger for noncontagious than for contagious diseases, and if so, how large
the differential is. The size of the differential illustrates additional infections that lead to additional
sick leave as a result of contagious presenteeism. These represent negative externalities under lower
sick pay.
Below we exploit German sick pay reforms and data on disease-specific sick leave rates to empirically
identify shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior.
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Using Population Influenza Rates to Identify Contagious Presenteeism
Now assume data on influenza activity from a large set of locations. Furthermore, assume that sick
pay schemes were implemented in some of these locations. Our model then predicts that access to
sick pay coverage reduces contagious presenteeism (Proposition 2 ). This leads to a reduction in the
share of individuals infected by a contagious disease.
Assume there is no sick pay at time zero (t = 0), and that sick pay is introduced after one year
(t = y1 ). Then the reduction in contagious diseases at t, φt , can be defined as

(15)

φt = ( pt − p0 ) f (σ).

Given appropriate data on contagious disease incidences, one can empirically test whether φt < 0;
i.e., whether sick pay coverage reduces the incidence rate of infectious diseases in the population.
φt < 0 would yield strong empirical evidence for a reducion in contagious workplace presenteeism
due to high sick pay.
Proposition 5a. Given the existence of a reform that exogenously introduced sick pay as well as
infectious disease data on differently affected populations, one can econometrically test if φt < 0, i.e.,
if the incidence of infectious diseases decreases when employees gain access to sick pay and, if so,
how large the reduction is.
Proposition 5b. The size of the differential, ∆φt , represents the decrease in infections as a result of
a decrease in contagious workplace presenteeism. It represents the decrease in negative population
externalities because of sick pay coverage.
Below we exploit US sick pay reforms and data on influenza rates to empirically identify contagious
presenteeism behavior and negative population externalities of minimal sick pay.

Evidence from German Sick Leave Reforms
The German Employer Sick Pay Mandate
Germany has one of the most generous universal sick leave systems in the world. The system is
predominantly based on employer mandates. In Germany, employers are mandated to continue
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wage payments for up to six weeks per sickness episode. In other words, employers have to provide
100 percent sick pay from the first day of a period of sickness without benefit caps.
In the case of illness, employees are obliged to inform their employer immediately about both the
sickness and the expected duration. From the fourth day of a sickness episode, a doctor’s certificate
is required. However, employers have the right to ask for a doctor’s note from day one of a spell,
and many employees voluntarily submit doctors’ notes from day one.
If the sickness lasts more than six continuous weeks, the doctor needs to issue a different certificate. From the seventh week onward, sick pay is disbursed by the health insurers (called “sickness
funds”) and lowered to 80 percent of foregone gross wages for those who are insured under Statutory
Health Insurance (SHI).12

The Policy Reforms of 1996 and 1999
Sick Pay Cut at the End of 1996
In 1996, the center-right government passed a Bill to Foster Growth and Employment, effective October 1, 1996. Panel A of Table A.1 in the appendix summarizes how the bill altered the federal
employer mandate. The most important provision of the bill reduced the minimum statutory sick
pay level from 100 percent to 80 percent of foregone wages.13 In addition to Table A.1, Ziebarth
and Karlsson (2010, 2014) provide more details on the regulatory changes and affected employee
groups. This paper solely focuses on the implementation at the industry level among private sector
employees who were covered by collective agreements.
Ongoing union pressure made employer associations in various industries—through collective
agreements—to voluntarily provide sick pay on top of the statutory regulations. Further, the question
of whether employees in specific industries were entitled to claim 100 percent or 80 percent of their
salary during sickness episodes was determined by existing collective agreements and their legal
interpretation. Some existing agreements explicitly, but probably coincidentally, stated that sick pay
would be 100 percent, while others did not mention sick pay at all. In the former case, sick pay would
12

In principle, there is no limit to the frequency of sick leave spells. However, if employees fall sick again due to the same
illness after an episode of six weeks, the law explicitly states that they are only again eligible for employer-provided sick
pay if at least six months have been passed between the two spells or twelve month have been passed since the beginning
of the first spell. This paragraph intends to avoid substitution of long-term spells by short-term spells.
13 In addition to this bill, another bill cut SHI long-term sick pay from the seventh week onward from 80 percent to 70
percent of forgone gross wages. Ziebarth (2013) shows that this second bill did not induce significant behavioral reactions
among the long-term sick.
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remain 100 percent despite the decrease in the generosity of the employer mandate, whereas in the
latter case, sick pay would decrease to 80 percent until a revised agreement was negotiated.
Review of collective agreements. We reviewed all collective agreements that existed during the
time of the sick pay reforms and categorized industries. Overall, one can distinguish three different
groups and industries: Panel B of Table A.1 provides the provisions at the industry level and our
categorization.
Group I is composed of the construction sector, whose collective agreement covered about 1.1
million private sector workers. When the law was passed in 1996, the existing collective agreement
did not include any explicit provision on sick pay, which is why the entire federal regulations applied
to the construction sector at the time of the bill’s implementation. A negotiated compromise between
unions and employers resulted in a new agreement which became effective July 1, 1997. This new
agreement specified that the cut in the replacement rate would only be applied during the first three
days of a sickness episode.14
Group II counts at least 4.4 million covered employees and is quantitatively the largest group. It
includes 11 industries as specified in the notes to Table A.1, among them the steel, textile and automobile industry. Union leaders in these industries managed to maintain the symbolically important
100 percent sick pay level. However, in return, they agreed to exclude paid overtime from the basis of calculation for sick pay, which effectively means that employees with a significant amount of
overtime hours experienced sick pay cuts.15
Group III is composed of seven industries, all of which stated in their collective agreements that
they would maintain 100 percent sick pay. Moreover, in contrast to Group II, these industries did not
exclude overtime payments from the basis of calculation. Hence the 4 million employees covered by
these agreements serve as control group in the evaluation of the 1997 sick pay cut.
14 In 1997 a minimum wage in the construction sector was introduced.

Theoretically a wage increase should also lead to a
reduction in sickness absence. However, Blien et al. (2009) and Rattenhuber (2011) only find small effects in East Germany,
which are no threat to the application of our method and the general empirical findings.
15 There are several reasons why this type of sick pay decrease may be of minor relevance: (a) Fraction of Employees
Effectively Affected. As representative SOEPGroup (2008) data show, among BKK insurees (which our main data set is
composed of), only 19% had paid overtime hours in 1998, the average being 4 hours per week. (b) Size of Cut. Whereas
a decrease in the base rate to 80% would reduce net sick pay by e 280 per month (in 1998 values), the exclusion of paid
overtime would only lead to a net cut of e 110 per month, conditional on working overtime and getting paid for it. (c)
Salience of Cut. While maintaining the 100% replacement level had a high symbolic meaning for unions, the indirect
reductions in sick pay were not communicated as openly, and it is questionable if every employee was aware of them. (d)
Affected individuals. One could suspect that employees with paid overtime hours might be highly motivated employees in
leading positions with a low number of sick days and a low propensity to shirk. However, as the SOEP shows, employees
with paid overtime had on average 10 sick days per year while those without paid overtime hours had only 4.7 sick days.
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Reversal of Main Sick Pay Cut 1999 and Remaining Changes
After the federal election was won by the new center-left coalition in 1998, as a reaction to the 1996
bill, the Bill for Social Insurance Corrections and to Protect Employee Rights was passed and became
effective January 1, 1999. It increased federally mandated sick pay again from 80 percent to 100
percent. However, as Table A.1 illustrates, while the main provision was reversed, two minor—but
potentially important—details made the new arrangements less generous than sick pay coverage
prior to October 1996. And in combination with the meanwhile negotiated collective agreements,
they affected the three groups in Table A.1 differently.
First, the four week waiting period—introduced in October 1996—was maintained. However, to
our knowledge no collective agreement had excluded the application of this waiting period, meaning
that none of the three groups was affected by this provision in 1999. Second, the 1999 bill explicitly
stated that paid overtime would be excluded from the basis of calculation. This provision was not
part of the 1996 reform bill; it was probably a reaction to the many collective agreements that had
implemented such a provision at the industry level in 1997 and 1998. However, because no industry
in Group I and III of Table A.1 excluded paid overtime voluntary in their 1997/1998 agreements,
ironically, Group III’s sick pay became less generous as a result of the 1999 center-left bill.
Thus, when evaluating the 1999 reform, Group II serves as the main control group that did not
experience any changes in their sick pay scheme between 1997/1998 and 1999. Group III was treated;
their sick pay scheme became less generous due the exclusion of paid overtime from the basis of
calculation.16 Again, as in 1996, Group I serves as the main treatment group whose sick pay level
was here increased from 80 percent to 100 percent.

Exploiting Administrative Data on Disease-Specific Sickness Absence: 1994–2004
In Germany, information on certified sickness absence—including diagnoses—are collected by the
124 nonprofit SHI sickness funds covering 90 percent of the population (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherungen GKV). In 1995, before the first reform, switching between health plans was not possible and employees were assigned to company-based health plans (Betriebskrankenkassen, BKKs) if their employer
offered such plans (similar to the employer-sponsored health plans in the U.S. but with mandatory
enrollment). In 1995, a total of 960 SHI sickness funds existed, and 690 or 72 percent of them were
company-based health plans (German Federal Statistical Office 2014). Employees covered by these
16 In the 1996 reform, Group II and Group III had reverse roles—Group II was treated with overtime exclusion and Group

III the control group. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the signs of the coefficient estimates.
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health plans were likely also covered by binding collective agreements. (Eibich et al. 2012; Schmitz
and Ziebarth forthcoming).
The Federal Association of Company-Based Sickness Funds (BKK Dachverband) annually publishes sick leave statistics of their 4.8 million enrollees (19 percent of all private sector employees) who
are mandatorily SHI insured and gainfully employed (Bundesverband der Betriebskrankenkassen
(BKK) 2004).17 The Krankheitsartenstatistik reports both the incidence as well as the length of sickness spells by gender, age group, ICD diagnoses, and industry. We collected and digitized information from annual reports between 1994 and 2004.18 The descriptive statistics are in the appendix,
Table A.2.
In total, we count 1,188 observations, where each observation represents one industry and year
as well as the diagnosed sickness category. More specifically, we count 11 years and 18 industries,
which adds up to 198 industry-year observations per diagnosis category.
Generated sick leave variables. Our outcome variable is the sick leave rate. This variable counts
the number of certified sickness spells per 100 enrollees (sick cases per 100 enrollees). We transform
each dependent variable by taking the logarithm.
Figure 2a shows the distribution of total sick cases per 100 enrollees and Figure 2b its logarithm.
In both cases we observe relatively symmetric, close to normal, distributions. The untransformed
plain variable has a mean of 125, implying 1.25 sick leave cases per year and enrollee across all
industries and years. However, the variation ranges from 90 to 163 (Figure 2a and Table A.2).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Looking at the disease categories and their incidence rates, one finds that the largest disease group
is respiratory diseases, ICD codes J00-J99, contributing 29 percent of all cases. Within this group, a
third of all cases are due to “bronchitis (J20)”, while a quarter is due to “influenza (J09).” Moreover,
another fifth are caused by “acute upper respiratory infections (J06).”
The second largest disease group with almost 20 percent of all cases is musculoskeletal diseases
(M00-M99), which have the reputation to be particularly prone to shirking behavior. The most note17 Although,

strictly speaking, BKKs are not legally obliged to contribute to the Krankheitsartenstatistik, the overwhelming majority does, probably simply out of tradition to contribute to this important statistic that has been existing since 1976.
In 2013, more than 90 percent of all mandatorily insured BKK enrollees were covered by the Krankheitsartenstatistik (BKK
2004; German Federal Statistical Office 2014). There is no evidence that this share systematically varied due to the reforms.
18 We cannot use earlier data due to a lack of consistency that goes back to an earlier reform. Although the data contain information on the duration of sickness spells by disease groups, we decided to not exploit this information as the
theoretical predictions of the reforms on the duration of spells are ambiguous.

18

worthy subcategory in this group is “dorsalgia - back pain (M54)” making up 70 percent of all musculoskeletal cases.
Next in terms of their incidence relevance are digestive diseases (K00-K93, 14 percent), injuries
and poisoning (S00-T98, 11 percent), followed by infectious diseases (A00-B99, 6 percent). The most
common digestive disease is “noninfective gastroenteritis (K52, 45 percent)”. Infectious diseases are
mainly made up of “viral infections (B34)” and “infectious gastroenteritis (A09).” Together over 80
percent of all cases coded as infectious diseases fall in these two subcategories.

Nonparametric Graphical Evidence
Figure 3 shows the “Development of Normalized Sick Leave Cases by Treatment Groups” over time.
Figure 3a shows the development for the overall Sick leave rate, Figure 3b looks at musculoskeletal
diseases, and Figures 3c and d plot diseases of the respiratory system as well as infectious diseases.
In addition to being normalized by the number of enrollees, these graphs are also adjusted with
respect to the reference year 1994, which is indexed as 100. The two black vertical bars indicate the
official implementation dates of the decrease and increase in sick pay g enerosity, r espectively. The
representation in Figure 3 serves two main purposes: 1) to examine the plausibility of the common
time assumption, and 2) to anticipate and visually illustrate the main findings and help understand
how they identify the model in Section in the second section. Musculoskeletal sick leave cases (e.g.,
back pain, Figure 3b) represent the category “noninfectious diseases” in our model in the second
section, whereas infectious sick leave cases (Figure 3d) represent the category “infectious diseases”
in our model. Respiratory sick leave cases (Figure 3c) is a mixed category.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The main identifying assumption in difference-in-differences(DiD) models is the common time
trend assumption. It assumes that the outcome variables of all treatment and control groups would
have developed in a parallel manner absent the treatment. The standard way to inspect its plausibility is to plot the outcome variables for the different groups graphically and assess their potentially
parallel development.
Overall, Figure 3 shows us the following: First, in general the data support the common time
trend assumption. Despite some minor spikes here and there, it is obvious that all three groups
in the four graphs develop in a pretty parallel manner over the 11 years without reform. In the
graphs, this is the case for the time periods before 1997 and after 2000. In particular Figure 3d—
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showing infectious diseases—illustrates a remarkably parallel development (and does not provide
any graphical evidence for a reform effect).
Second, with the exception of infectious diseases, the other three graphs provide strong evidence
of a significant reform effect for Group I (see Table A.1). Immediately after the reform implementation, we observe a 20 percent decrease in the sick leave rate for the overall disease category.19 As
for musculoskeletal diseases—the category representing noninfectious diseases in our model—the
decrease is almost twice as large and around -40% for Group I, suggesting strong increases in shirking behavior. As for respiratory diseases—the mixed disease category that also includes flues and
common colds—the decrease is only around -10%. Finally, as for infectious disease—the category
representing infectious diseases in our model—we do not observe much evidence for any reform
effect.
Third, the gap between the differently affected groups unambiguously, not but entirely, closes
after 2000. This suggests that the behavioral reaction after the reversal of the sick pay cut kicks in
delayed, probably due to the relatively low media coverage when the law was reversed. Moreover,
there is evidence for time persistence or habit formation in sick leave behavior, since the regulations
were again identical for all three groups post-1999 (Table A.1), and all three groups started with the
same initial sick leave level prior to 1997. However, we still observe significant differences between
the three groups, even as late as 2004.
Fourth, the reaction to the soft sick pay cut—excluding overtime from the basis of calculation—
was obviously asymmetric. Figure 3 does not provide much evidence that excluding overtime affected Group II’s behavior in 1997 and 1998. However, the graphical evidence suggests that the very
same measure had a significant impact on Group III post 1999.20
Relating these findings to our model above, one can summarize that there is clear evidence for
a significant and persistent decrease in the absence rate following a sick pay cut, β t > 0 (Proposition
4a). Similarly, sick leave rates increase when the system becomes more generous. Additionally,
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This is in line with the two other existing studies evaluating this reform using SOEP data (Ziebarth and Karlsson 2010;
Puhani and Sonderhof 2010)
20 There are two potential explanations for this finding. 1) Relevance of Relative Changes. The decrease in sick pay at
the end of 1996 was heatedly debated in German society and led to strikes. The main (media) focus was clearly on the
decrease in the overall sick pay level. It is plausible that Group II did not react since the main reference point mattered
here, which was the decrease in the default federal level. About 50 percent of all employees experienced a decrease in
the level to 80 percent (Ridinger 1997; Jahn 1998). Hence the exclusion of overtime pay was, relatively seen, negligible for
affected workers. It may not even have been noticed by the affected employees. After unions managed to negotiate the
general sick pay level to remain at 100 percent, they marketed and emphasized this success accordingly—but either did
not mention, or heavily down played the overtime cut. In 1999, by contrast, the exclusion of paid overtime was the only
regulatory change that made employees worse off. 2) LATE. Since the model identifies the Local Average Treatment Effect
(LATE), it could simply be that paid overtime was more relevant for Group III than for Group II.
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the labor Aupply adjustment of contagious diseases is smaller (and in fact close to zero) than the
adjustment of noncontagious diseases and thus Proposition 4c, βnt > βct, holds up. We also find a
large decrease in shirking βnt > 0 whereas the increase in presenteeism outweighs additional
infections βct > 0 (Proposition 4b). Finally, because βnt − βct > 0, the German sick pay cut also led to
an increase in infections (Proposition 4b).

Parametric Difference-in-Differences Model
We now estimate the following conventional parametric DiD model separately for different disease
categories:

(16)

log(yit ) = γi + β 0 + β 1 GroupIi ×0 97 −0 98 + β 2 GroupIi ×0 99 −0 04+
β 3 GroupI Ii ×0 97 −0 98 + β 4 GroupI Ii ×0 99 −0 04+

+ δt + µit

where log(yit ) stands for one of our dependent sick leave measures for industry i at time t. γi are
17 industry fixed effects and δt 10 year fixed effects. The standard errors are routinely clustered at the
industry level. We interact the treatment indicators as defined below with two time period dummy
variables ’97-’98 and ’99-’04. The reference period is the years 1994 to 1996.
GroupIi as well as GroupI Ii are binary treatment indicators. As for the 1996 reform, Group I
experienced a sick pay cut from 100 percent to 80 percent, while Group II underwent a soft sick pay
cut—with paid overtime excluded (Table A.1). Group III was not affected, serving as the control
group. Thus β 1 identifies the effect of the sick pay cut for Group I relative to Group III and the
years 1997/1998 and relative to the time between 1994 and 1996. Moreover, β 3 identifies the effect of
excluding paid overtime for Group II in 1997/1998 relative to the pre-reform period.
As for the 1999 reform, the main pay level was increased again for Group I, but overtime excluded
from the basis of calculation. Group II was not affected and serves as control group. Group III
experienced a soft cut (Table A.1). Thus, β 2 identifies the post-1999 level effect, relative to pre-1997
levels, or the joint effect of the two reforms for Group I. Moreover, the difference β 2 − β 1 identifies the
effect of the increase in sick pay levels from 80 percent to 100 percent after 1999 relative to 1997/1998.
In contrast, β 3 -β 4 identifies the effect of the overtime exclusion for Group III in the post-1999 era
relative to pre-1999. Recall that overtime was excluded for Group II in 1997 while nothing happened
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to Group III, whereas in 1999, overtime was excluded for Group III while nothing happened to Group
II. Consequently, − β 4 + β 3 identifies the estimate of the 1999 overtime exclusion for Group III. Hence,
we differentiate three different groups over three different time periods but only need to estimate
four relevant parameters. Since the outcome measures are in logarithms, β 1 to β 4 directly provide
the reform-related change of the outcome variable in percent.

Disease-Specific Labor Supply Adjustments: Decomposing Moral Hazard
Estimating β̂ t , β̂ nt , and β̂ ct . Table 1 shows the results of the DiD model in Equation (16) using different outcome variables: the logarithm of sick cases per 100 enrollees by the disease categories total,
musculoskeletal, infectious, respiratory, and injuries & poisoning. Each column is one model as in
Equation (16). For illustrative purposes, we solely show the coefficients of β 1 to β 4 and suppress the
remaining ones. In the row below, we display the results of an F-test β 2 − β 1 = 0 to test for the effect
of the level increase for Group I relative to Group III in 1999. As discussed in the previous section,
the empirical models closely identify the theoretical model. For example, β 1 in the first row of the
first column of Table 1 estimates β t in Equation (14) and tests Proposition 4a. The finding is then
cross-checked by β 2 − β 1 = 0 which likewise test Proposition 4a using the increase in sick pay as as
an exogenous source of variation.
Note that the overtime exclusion, or “soft sick pay cut” as we call it, essentially also tests Proposition 4a and the size and sign of β t in Equation (14) since any variant of making the sick pay less
generous could be interpreted as a decrease in sick pay. However, we believe that the best suited
coefficient estimates to test Propositions 4a–c are the ones resulting from GroupIi ×0 97 −0 98—the
β 1 s for the different disease categories. These are the effects of the initial reduction in the sick pay
replacement rate from 100 percent to 80 percent in 1997/1998. However, we double and cross-check
the consistency and plausibility of these main β 1 findings using the effects of the increase in the replacement rate from 80 percent to 100 percent in 1999 (β 2 − β 1 ), the exclusion of overtime for Group
II in 1997 (β 3 ) and Group III and 1999 (β 3 − β 4 ), as well as the overall development of the sick leave
rates from 1999 to 2004—when the system as a whole was more restrictive—relative to 1994 to 1996
(β 2 ; β 4 ).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
One can summarize the following from Table 1: First, during the time when sick pay was cut to
80 percent, in 1997 and 1998, we find overall decreases in the sickness rate by about 22 percent (β 1 in
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column (1)). This reflects β̂ t in Equation (14), i.e., the total moral hazard effect. As seen, β 1 is highly
significant and clearly larger than zero, which confirms Proposition 4a. Related to the decrease in
sick pay of 20 percent, one obtains a sickness rate elasticity with respect to the replacement rate of
about one. Decreases of about 20 percent are also found for the “mixed” infectious and noninfectious
category of respiratory diseases (columns [3] and [4]).
Second, musculoskeletal diseases represent the noncontagious disease category n in our model in
the second section. Following the sick pay cut, the sick leave rate of musculoskeletal diseases decreased overproportionally by 34 percent (column [5], β 1 ). The overproportional decrease for musculoskeletal diseases, which is composed of 70 percent back pain cases, fits the common perception
that the labor supply of this category is particularly elastic and prone to shirking behavior. Equation
(9) of our model illustrates the analytical derivation of β nt , β nt , which is represented by β 1 in column
(5) of Table 1, equals the decrease in shirking as sick pay decreases.
Third, infectious diseases, ICD-10 codes A00-B99, represents the contagious disease category c
in our model. The estimate stands for the β ct in our model in Equation (11). As β 1 in column (2)
of Table 1 shows, the infectious disease rate fell underproportionally by an estimated 15 percent as
a response to the sick pay cut in 1997/1998. Note that this estimate is likely upward biased, since
the pre-1997 common time trend for infectious diseases is not 100 percent clean, as Figure 3d nicely
illustrates. The unbiased estimate likely tends toward zero. In any case, while the findings suggest
that β nt > β ct as formulated in Hypothesis 1 and Proposition 4c, it is also clear that β̂ t > 0 holds,
meaning that the reform led to a decrease in overall sickness absence.
Further Results and Robustness Checks. The labor supply effect in column (6) of Table 1 serves
as a robustness test since 50% of all injuries & poisoning absences are due to workplace accidents
(BKK 2004). The first bill that cut sick pay, however, excluded sick leave due to workplace accidents
from the cuts (see Table A.1). Indeed, as see by β 1 in column (6), the injuries & poisoning absence
rate decreased underproportionally by almost exactly half the rate than the overall rate, namely by
11.2 percent instead of 22 percent.
Second, the β 2 estimate provides the change in sickness rates in the post-1999 era relative to the
pre-1997 era for Group I. Meanwhile, the F-test, β 2 - β 1 = 0, yields the effect of the increase in the
replacement rate to 100 percent in 1999. Thus β 2 reflects the long-term impact after a series of reforms
that made the overall system more restrictive and shows a decrease of 13.5 percent at the 10 percent
significance level for all diseases. β 2 - β 1 is highly significant for all but infectious diseases. Column
(1) suggests that the overall rate increased by 8.4 percent after the reversal. Column (5) confirms the
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findings above and suggests that musculoskeletal diseases, i.e. back pain, reacted overproportionally
with an increase of 19.1 percent following the increase in sick pay to 100 percent.
Third, all separate β 3 and β 4 estimates are imprecise and relatively small in size meaning that—
in a regression framework that employs industry and year fixed effects—we are unable to detect
significant sick leave rate changes in response to the mild sick leave cuts that excluded overtime
from the basis of calculation. However, this is at least partly a function of the statistical power that
our data offer. Note that all coefficients carry the expected sign and most magnitudes lie around 3 to
5%.

Does the Decrease in Shirking Outweigh the Externalities of Contagious Presenteeism?
Estimating β nt - β ct . To directly test the model predictions, we now pool all disease categories and
estimate a triple difference model. Proposition 4c allows us to directly carry out the following statistical tests β nt = β ct . The triple difference model is similar to the one in Equation (16) above but pools
all disease groups and adds additional triple interaction terms like λ1 GroupIi ×0 97 −0 98 × Disd ,
λ2 GroupIi ×0 99 −0 04 × Disd etc. to the model, where Disd represents a vector of disease indicators.
The estimates for λ then directly indicate how the reform effect for every disease category differs
from the baseline disease effect.
Table A.4 shows the results of this triple difference model. Column (1) of Table A.4 simply replicates column (5) of Table 1 focusing on musculoskeletal diseases, our proxy for noncontagious diseases.
Column (2) adds the main contagious disease category infectious diseases and has thus twice
as many observations (396 industry-year estimates). With musculoskeletal diseases as the baseline
category, the four triple DiD interaction terms 1) GroupIi ×0 97 −0 98 × In f ectious, 2) GroupIi ×0 99 −0
04 × In f ectious, 3) GroupI Ii ×0 97 −0 98 × In f ectious, and 4) GroupI Ii ×0 99 −0 04 × In f ectious directly
test Hypothesis 1 (β nt = β ct ). What Table 1 already suggested can now be tested with statistical
certainty in column (2) of Table A.4: β̂ ct - β̂ nt = 19.3 percentage points, meaning that the decrease in
the contagious sick leave rate was a significant 19.3 percentage points smaller than the decrease in
the noncontagious sick leave rate (14.8 percent vs. 34.1 percent, see columns [2] and [5] of Table 1).
Again, this is likely an underestimate since we likely overestimate β ct . Figures 3b and 3d illustrate
very nicely and even more clearly than Table A.4 that there was basically no behavioral reaction for
infectious diseases while one observes substantial behavioral reactions for musculoskeletal diseases.
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Column (3) additionally adds respiratory diseases to the data set. While not all respiratory diseases are contagious, this category contains “influenza (J09)”, commonly referred to as the flu. As
above, the four triple interaction terms identify the differential effect relative to the baseline category musculoskeletal diseases. Although we lack statistical power, there is suggestive evidence that
the respiratory sick leave rate decreased by about 13 percent less than the noncontagious baseline.
Similarly, the impact of the soft cut for Group III seems to have been less strong.

Evidence from U.S. Sick Leave Reforms
This section exploits variation in the implementation of several U.S. sick leave schemes across space
and over time in order to test preposition 5. We take advantage of Google Flu Trends data (Google
2015) at the weekly regional level from 2003 to 2015 to estimate the effect of sick leave on flu rates. Introducing a paid sick leave system is equivalent to increasing sick leave benefit levels which, according to our model, unambiguously increases sick leave utilization (

∂σ∗ (α)
∂α

< 0). Furthermore, access to

paid sick leave would lead to an increase in shirking behavior as well as a decrease in contagious presenteeism (Hypothesis 1 ). Unlike in the third section, we are unable to estimate disease-specific labor
supply reactions directly. However, Google Flu Trends allow us to test whether overall population
flu infection rates decreased after the legislature mandated employers to provide sick leave opportunities as suggested by Proposition 5 . A subsequent decrease in flu infection rates are thus a direct
implication of our model and would yield strong evidence for a decrease in contagious workplace
presenteeism.

The U.S. Sick Leave Landscape
The United States is the only industrialized country without universal access to paid sick leave.
About half of the workforce lacks access to paid sick leave, particularly low-income employees in the
service sector (Heymann et al. 2009; Susser and Ziebarth 2015).
Appendix Table B.1 provides a comprehensive summary of recent sick pay reform at the city and
state level. The details of the bills differ from city to city and state to state but, basically, all sick
pay schemes represent employer mandates. Mostly small firms are exempt or face less restrictions.
Employees “earn” paid sick pay credit (typically one hour per 40 hours worked) up to nine days per
year, and this credit rolls over to the next calendar year if unused. Because employees need to accrue
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sick pay credit, most sick pay schemes explicitly state a 90-day accrual period. However, the right to
take unpaid sick leave is part of most sick pay schemes.
As Table B.1 shows, San Francisco was the first city to introduce paid sick leave on February 5,
2007. Washington, D.C., followed on November 13, 2008, and extended its sick pay in February 22,
2014 to temporary workers and tipped employees. Seattle (September 1, 2012), Portland (January
1, 2014), New York City (April 1, 2014), and Philadelphia (May 13, 2015) followed recently. On the
state level, we again include the District of Columbia area with the two sick pay introduction and
extension in 2008 and 2014, respectively. Connecticut (January 1, 2012) followed, however, it only
applied to service sector employees in non-small businesses and covered about 20 percent of the
workforce. Very recent newly introduced schemes in California (July 1, 2015), Massachusetts (July 1,
2015), and Oregon (Jan 1, 2016) are significantly more comprehensive (see Table B.1).

Exploiting Google Flu Trends Data to Test for Changes in Infections: 2003–2015
We exploit weekly Google Flu Trends data at the city and state level from 2003 to 2015 to test for
changes in influenza rates following the introduction of sick pay schemes (Google 2015). Google
provides these data in processed form. The basic idea is that Google search queries can be used
to predict and replicate actual influenza infection rates. It has been shown that Google Flu Trends
accurately estimates weekly influenza activity in each region of the U.S. (Carneiro and Mylonakis
2009; Ginsberg et al. 2009).21
We use two main Google Flu Trends samples. The first sample contains the weekly flu rates of
all major U.S. cities—97 in total—from 2003 to 2015, as listed in columns (1) and (2) of Appendix
Table B.2. The specific start dates are also listed in Table B.2.22 We include data for most cities
starting September 28, 2003. The end date for all cities is July 26, 2015. For our first sample of 97 U.S.
metropolitan areas, this results in 57,414 city-week observations. The second sample contains all U.S.
states and counts 30,141 state-week observations.
Generated outcome variable. We use the data that is provided by Google (2015), aggregated at
the regional week-of-the-year level. According to Google, strictly speaking, the U.S. data represent
21 There are reports that Google Flu Trends would overestimate actual influenza rates (Lazer et al. 2014). However,
even if systematic over- or underestimation occurs, it should not be a threat to our estimates as long as the bias is not
correlated with the introduction of sick pay schemes at the regional level. Our rich fixed effects specifications with region
and week-of-year fixed effects nets out time-variant seasonal trends in influenza activities and considers time-invariant
region specifics. Also note that we used Google Trends retrospectively to test for regional changes in infection rates and do
not intend to predict epidemic outbreaks earlier than the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
22 We omit the city of New Orleans, which was missing variables of interest due to Hurricane Katrina.
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the number of influenza-like illnesses (ILI) per 100,000 doctor visits. We take the logarithm of these
data as dependent variable.
Hence the dependent variable can be interpreted as “diagnosed influenza-like illnesses (ILI).”
Because—unlike in Germany—the U.S. sick pay mandates do not require a doctor’s note in order to
take sick pay, one would not expect that doctor visits increase due to the sick pay reforms. However,
even if that was the case, it still would not be a main threat to our estimates—our estimate of the
decrease in influenza-like activity would then represent a lower bound.
Treatment and control groups.Appendix Table B.1 provides the list of cities and states that implemented sick pay schemes between 2006 and 2015. When using our first sample of cities, all seven
listed major cities and Washington, D.C., belong to the treatment group and all other cities to the
control group. Analogously, the five states that implemented sick pay schemes so far—District of
Columbia, Connecticut, California, Massachusetts, and Oregon—belong to the treatment group in
the second sample with state-week observations.
In addition to Google Flu Trends data, we use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2015)
to control for monthly unemployment rates in our model. The unit of observation in the BLS data
is equal to the unit of observation in the Google Flu Trends data. Accordingly, we merge in BLS
monthly unemployment rates at the level of the cities and states as reported in Table B.2.

Parametric Difference-in-Differences Model
The staggered implementation of sick pay schemes across space and over time naturally leads to the
estimation of the following standard DiD model, similar to the one above for Germany.

(17)

log(yit ) = φTreatedCityi × LawE f f ectivet + δt + γi + Unempit + µit

where log(yit ) is the logarithm of the reported Google (2015) flu rate in city i in week of the year t.
γi are 96 city fixed effects and δt a rich set of week-of-the-year fixed effects over 12 years. TreatedCityi
is a treatment indicator which is one for cities that implemented a sick pay scheme between 2003
and 2015, see Table B.1. The interaction with the vector LawE f f ectivet yields the binary variable
of interest. The interaction is one for cities and time periods where a sick pay scheme was legally
implemented (see Table B.1, column [3]). In addition to the rich set of city and time fixed effects, we
control for the monthly BLS provided unemployment rate at the city level, Unempci . The standard
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errors are routinely clustered at the city level. Thus this empirical specification allows us to estimate
φt , i.e. the reduction in contagious disease morbidity through the introduction of sick pay defined
above.
State level estimation. Our second main model specification estimates the entire model at the
state-week level. The idea is to capture the effects of the sick pay scheme introduction in the District
of Columbia, Connecticut, California, and Massachusetts (see Table B.1). Accordingly, we use our
second Google Flu Trends sample covering weekly state level data from 2003 to 2015; all i subscripts
in Equation (17) now represent states, not cities.
Event study. Lastly, to plot an event study graph, we replace the binary LawE f f ectivet time indicator with one that continuously counts the number of days until (and from) a law became effective—
from -720 days to 0 and +720 days. This allows us to net out, normalize and graphically plot changes
in flu rates, relative to when the laws were implemented.

Changes in Influenza Activity When Employees Gain Sick Pay Access
We begin by discussing the estimation results of the DiD model in Equation (17). Table 2 shows
the findings for our first sample of U.S. cities from 2003 to 2015. As usual, every column represents
one model where the first two columns represent the standard model. The only difference between
evenly and unevenly numbered columns is that the evenly numbered columns additionally control
for the monthly unemployment rate at the city level.
Comparing the TreatedCity ×LawEffective coefficient estimates in the first two columns, we see
that controlling for the monthly unemployment rate barely alters the results—a finding that likewise
holds up for columns (3) - (6). Importantly, the first two columns provide negative coefficient estimates that are significant at the 5 percent level. The literal interpretation would be that influenza-like
illnesses (ILI) per 100,000 doctor visits decrease by about 5.5 percent when employees gain access
to paid (and unpaid) sick leave coverage. Prereform, roughly half of all employees had no paid sick
leave coverage (Susser and Ziebarth 2015). Although the laws tend to be less stringent for small businesses, as Table B.1 shows, most city-based laws are relatively comprehensive and typically cover all
private sector employees. Hence, scaling the 5 percent estimate accordingly implies that populationlevel influenza infection rates would decrease by about 10 percent when U.S. employees obtain paid
sick leave coverage with the right to take unpaid leave or earn up to nine paid sick days per year.
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It is also worthwhile to emphasize that this is a weighted estimate over all seven U.S. cities that
implemented paid sick leave, and that these are short- to medium-term estimates. For three cities
(NYC, Portland, Newark), we cover more than a year of post-reform influenza activity, and for three
other cities (SF, DC, Seattle), we cover at least three years of postreform influenza rates.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The models in columns (3) and (4) now replace the city-specific dates indicating when the laws
became effective in LawEffective (Column [2], Table B.1) with the city-specific dates indicating when
the laws were passed by the city legislature (LawPassed ). As column (3) of B.1 shows, the time
span between when the laws were passed and when they became effective amounts up to one year.
It is at least imaginable that private firms voluntarily implemented sick pay schemes ahead of the
official date. However, as seen, columns (3) and (4) do not provide much evidence that this was the
case—the coefficients shrink in size to about 3 percent and are not statistically significant any more.
Lastly, the models in columns (5) and (6) use time indicators that only become one after the probation or accrual period has been passed (LawProbation). As discussed, all laws require employees
to “earn” their sick pay. Employees accrue one hour of paid sick leave per 30 or 40 hours of work,
i.e., per full-time work week (Table B.1). In addition, all laws specify a minimum accrual period of
typically 90 days that needs to elapse before employees can take paid sick leave for the first time.
Assuming that the first paid sick day can be taken after 12 full work weeks, each earning employees
one hour of sick pay, then full-time employees who fall sick are able to take 1.5 paid sick days after
three months. However, as mentioned, it should be noted that the option to take unpaid sick leave is
typically part of these sick pay schemes. Letting the data speak, we can say that the decrease in flu
rates increases by one percentage point, when the actual treatment period is defined after the minimum accrual period elapsed. Because the first three months since the implementation of the laws
now fall into the prereform period which may have already seen decreases in flu activity, we likely
underestimate the long-term effect in columns (5) and (6).
Figure 4a shows the Event Study Graph for Table 2. Here we plot the coefficient estimates when
we replace the binary time indicators in LawEffective with continued time indicators that count the
days before and after the laws became effective in each city. Recall that the coefficient estimates
are net of city fixed effects and week-of-the-year fixed effects, i.e., correct for common influenza
seasonalities across all major U.S. metropolitan areas. Figure 4a demonstrates very little trending
in the two years before the sick pay schemes became effective. The coefficient estimates are not
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statistically different from zero and fluctuate around only slightly around the zero line. In line with
the estimate in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, there is not much evidence for anticipation effects.
Immediately after all employees gained access to paid and unpaid sick leave, the infection rates
decrease significantly by up to 20 percent. Note that the estimates past 480 days following the law
lack precision because they are solely based on the experiences in San Francisco (2007), D.C. (2008
and 2014), and Seattle (2012). New York City’s comprehensive bill became effective April 1, 2014—
about one year and fours months before the end of our observation period at the end of July 2015.
Portland’s bill took effect in January 2014, and Newark’s bill at the end of May 2014.
Hence, the fact that one seems to observe a long-term rebound of infection rates to the zero line
is determined by a lack of precision and the early experiences in San Francisco (2007), DC (2008
and 2014), and Seattle (2012). More importantly, the rebound may be driven by the confounding
effect of the Great Recession in 2009/2010 for San Francisco (it is known that fear of unemployment
increases presenteeism), as well as a lax first sick pay law in DC with many exemptions (which was
later fixed in 2014). However, overall, Figure 4a nicely illustrates the clear and significant decrease
in influenza infection rates at the population level after employees found sick leave coverage. These
findings validate our model predictions. They provide strong evidence that contagious presenteeism
decreased and that sick and contagious employees stayed at home to recover instead of going to
work, and that this change in employee behavior led to the clear decrease in infection rates by up to
20 percent.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
The setup of Table 3 follows Table 2. The only difference is that we now estimate the DiD models at the state-week level. States in the treatment group are now D.C. (2008), Connecticut (2012),
California (2015), and Massachusetts (2015). However, unfortunately, the bills in California and Massachusetts only became effective July 1, 2015 and our Google Flu Trends observation period ends
at the end of July 2015. Hence estimates outside the 26 day postreform window are exclusively
driven by Connecticut and D.C.. In addition, as a reminder, Connecticut’s law only covers service
sector employees in non-small businesses which represent about 20 percent of the workforce and
also the first DC law was quite lax. Because effectively reducing contagious disease infection rates
requires comprehensive measures and preventing infections for as many susceptibles as possible
(Vynnycky and White 2010), and because two important states are only briefly covered in the
summer months following the law, we expect the effects of the state level estimates to be less
pronounced.
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[Insert Table 3 about here]
In line with our expectations, and maybe surprisingly, we still identify a marginally significant decrease in influenza rates of about 2.5 percent following the laws in D.C., Connecticut, California, and
Massachusetts (Columns [1] and [2]). Again, there is not much evidence that a significant amount of
employers (who did not provide paid sick leave to this date) provided sick pay voluntarily between
the passage of the law and its implementation. The size of the coefficients in columns (3) and (4) are
attenuated, only around −1 percent, but not statistically significant. The same is true for the estimates
in columns (5) and (6) which are solely based on D.C. and Connecticut because the end of the official
accrual period (90 days) lies outside of our window of observation for California and Massachusetts.
The event study in Figure 4b provides a clearer picture. While the two-year period before the
reform implementation provides estimates that fluctuate consistently around the zero line and are
never significantly different from zero, the infection rates slightly trend downward in the postreform
period. However, the estimates are partly noisy and lack statistical power. Again, recall that only
the first 26 days are based on evidence from four states, while all other postreform estimates are
exclusively based on the patchy Connecticut bill and the two step introduction in D.C..

Conclusion
Empirically identifying presenteeism behavior is extremely challenging, yet crucial in order to test
for one major economic justification f or p ublicly p rovided s ick p ay: t he n egative e xternalities associated with contagious presenteeism. Contagious presenteeism refers to the phenomenon when
employees with infectious diseases go to work sick and infect coworkers and customers. Such behavior is a major public health issue and one driving force of the spread of contagious diseases. If
contagion is unobservable, which is usually the case at the beginning of a sickness episode, then state
regulation may reduce market inefficiencies by mandating employers to provide monetary incentives
for employees to stay home when sick. If such monetary incentives work, and economic theory as
well empirical studies strongly suggest that they do, then public sick pay schemes reduce contagious
presenteeism and the spread of diseases.
To our knowledge, this study is the first t hat t heoretically d erives a nd e mpirically implements
tests for the existence of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance
schemes. First, our model theoretically defines different possible cases of workplace absence behavior under contagious and noncontagious continuous sickness levels. As such, we also decompose
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classical moral hazard into shirking behavior and contagious presenteeism. The former does not imply negative health spillovers, whereas case the latter does. We derive conditions to be able to test
for moral hazard and its decomposed elements.
We first exploit two German sick pay reforms and administrative physician-certified sick leave
data at the industry level to provide empirical evidence for the existence of contagious presenteeism,
which we indeed find. H owever, w e a lso s how t hat, i n G ermany, w ith o ne o f t he m ost generous
sick leave systems worldwide, the reduction in shirking behavior was larger than the increase in the
infectious disease rate (due to contagious presenteeism) when sick pay was cut from a baseline level
of 100 percent.
Next, we exploit the staggered implementation of employer sick pay mandates at the city and
state level in the U.S.. Using Google Flu Trends data, we show that influenza rates decrease significantly when employees gain access to paid sick leave. About half of all U.S. employees do not have
access to paid sick leave. The relatively comprehensive laws at the level of seven major U.S. cities
and our estimates suggest that influenza-like infection rates decrease by about 10 percent when employees without coverage obtain access to paid or unpaid sick leave. Although most city ordinances
are comprehensive in the sense that they cover all employees and provide a wage replacement of 100
percent, they are less comprehensive in the sense that employees have to work one week full-time to
earn one hour of sick leave up to a maximum of typically eight days per year. Hence, a significant
share of the reduction in infection rates found in this paper is likely driven by legally guaranteed access to unpaid leave. The findings suggest that infections rates may further decrease in the
medium- to long-run when employees have accrued a significant amount of paid sick days.
Researchers should exploit different settings and our proposed method, or variants of it, to test
for the existence and the degree of contagious presenteeism, shirking behavior, and the overall level
of moral hazard. Important fields of applications include contagious presenteeism by teachers or
school kids, e.g., induced by teacher or parental sick pay schemes that may or may not cover sickness
of children. Schools are important sources for the spread of contagious diseases. Another relevant
setting would be the firm level to test for contagious presenteeism behavior by employees with a
high degree of customer contact and related decreases in productivity. As a last example, contagious
presenteeism behavior by health care workers can be life-threatening for patients but potentially
minimized by optimized sick pay schemes. Note that our test can be carried out using many different
types of data, including school-level, firm-level data, or hospital-level data. Ideally, one would want
to exogenously vary the generosity of the sick pay scheme under investigation, then measure changes
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in shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior, and then readjust until both undesirable employee
behaviors are minimized.
More research is also needed in order to better understand how exactly contagious presenteeism
leads to infections of coworkers and customers and how it affects overall workplace productivity. Firm-level and employee-level compensation strategies to dampen sickness-related productivity
losses are also fruitful relevant research questions.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1 Graphical Representation and Classification of Shares of Employees Working and on Sick Leave

Panel A: Noncontagious Diseases
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Panel A shows the share of employees who draw a noncontagious disease. After the sick pay cut, shirking
decreases. Panel B depicts the same situation for contagious diseases. A sick pay cut increases contagious
presenteeism and pt , represented by the outward shift of the curve.
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Figure 2 Distribution of (a) Sick Leave Cases and (b) Logarithm of Sick Leave Cases per 100 Employees

Figure 3 Development of Sick Leave Rates by Treatment Groups Over Time
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The solid line shows the development of industries in Group I. This group experienced a sick pay cut from 100% to 80%
in 1997 and the reverse of this cut in 1999. The short dashed line represents Group II. This group witnessed a “soft cut” in
1997 through the exclusion of overtime. Finally, the long dashed line depicts Group III, which had a soft cut in 1999. For
more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table A.1.
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Figure 4 Event Study—Effect of Sick Pay Mandates on
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Table 1 Effect of Changes in Sick Pay on Normalized Cases of Sick Leave by Disease Groups
All diseases
(1)

Infectious
(2)

Respiratory
(3)

Musculosk.
(5)

Inj. & Pois.
(6)

Group I×’97-’98
(Effect of Cut ’97)

-0.220***
(0.057)

-0.148***
(0.047)

-0.208***
(0.054)

-0.341***
(0.076)

-0.112**
(0.045)

Group I×’99-’04
(Level post-’99 vs. pre-’97)

-0.135*
(0.070)

-0.075
(0.053)

-0.131***
(0.044)

-0.150
(0.157)

0.030
(0.087)

Group II×’97-’98
(Effect of Soft Cut ’97)

-0.029
(0.065)

-0.041
(0.073)

-0.022
(0.061)

-0.038
(0.086)

-0.006
(0.065)

Group II×’99-’04
(Level post-’99 vs. pre-’97)

0.053
(0.078)

0.053
(0.070)

0.017
(0.055)

0.131
(0.164)

0.107
(0.095)

[Group I×’99-’04] - [Group I×’97-’98]
pvalue
(Effect of Increase ’99)

0.084***
0.000

0.073
0.121

0.077***
0.000

0.191**
0.032

0.142***
0.004

R2
Observations
Number of industries

0.659
198
18

0.949
198
18

0.816
198
18

0.858
198
18

0.918
198
18

NOTE: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the industry level. All regressions are weighted by
the annual number of industry-specific sickness fund enrollees. The descriptive statistics are in the Appendix (Table A.2). Each column
represents one model as in equation (16), estimated by OLS, i.e., all models include industry and year fixed e ffects. The dependent
variables are logarithms of the normalized sick leave cases per 100 employees. Column (1) employs the total number of sick leave
cases as dependent variable, column (2) solely uses certified infectious sick leave cases and so on. For more information on how the
variables were generated, see the section “Exploiting Administrative Data on Disease-Specific Sickness Absence: 1994–2004.” Treated
is a treatment indicator with one for Group I and zero for Group III, whereas PartlyTreated is one for Group II and zero for Group
III. Group I experienced a sick pay cut from 100 to 80% in 1997 and a reversal in 1999. Group II experienced a soft cut in 1997 and
Group III experienced a soft cut in 1999. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table A.1.

SOURCE: BKK (2004), own calculation and illustration;

Table 2 Effect of Introduction of Sick Pay Mandates on Influenza Rate (Sample I: U.S. Cities 2003-2015)

TreatedCity×LawEffective

(1)

(2)

-0.0572**
(0.0234)

-0.0554**
(0.0230)

TreatedCity×LawPassed

(3)

(4)

-0.0300
(0.0233)

-0.0281
(0.0235)

TreatedCity×ProbationOver

N

57,414

57,414

57,414

57,414

(5)

(6)

-0.0643**
(0.0291)

-0.0628**
(0.0285)

57,414

57,414

NOTE: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the city level. The dependent
variable is always the logarithm of the number of influenza-like illnesses (ILI) per 100,000 doctor visits as reported
by Google (2015). All regressions contain week-of-year fixed effects and city fixed effects as in equation (17). Each
column represents one model, estimated by OLS. Even numbered columns additionally control for the local monthly
unemployment rate (BLS 2015). TreatedCity is a treatment indicator which is one for all cities listed in Table B.1. The
entire sample of cities considered is in columns one and two of Table B.2.
SOURCE: Google (2015), own calculation and illustration.

Table 3 Effect of Introduction of Sick Pay Mandates on Influenza Rate (Sample II: U.S. States 2003-2015)

TreatedState×LawEffective

(1)

(2)

-0.0223*
(0.0131)

-0.0264*
(0.0147)

TreatedState×LawPassed

(3)

(4)

-0.00889
(0.0179)

-0.0113
(0.0198)

TreatedState×ProbationOver

N

30,141

30,141

30,141

30,141

(5)

(6)

-0.0139
(0.0104)

-0.0185
(0.0112)

30,141

30,141

NOTE: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. The dependent
variable is always the logarithm of the number of influenza-like illnesses (ILI) per 100,000 doctor visits as reported
by Google (2015). All regressions contain week-of-year fixed effects and state fixed effects as in equation (17). Each
column represents one model, estimated by OLS. Even numbered columns additionally control for the monthly
unemployment rate in the state (BLS 2015). TreatedState is a treatment indicator which is one for all states listed in
Table B.1. The entire sample of states considered is in column three of Table B.2.
SOURCE: Google (2015), own calculation and illustration;
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Appendix A
Table A.1 Detailed Overview of Reductions and Increases in German Federal Employer Sick Pay Mandates and Industry-Specific Collective Agreements
Before 10/1996
(1)
Panel A: Federal Employer Mandate Regulations
100% sick pay
No waiting period for new employees
Paid overtime included in basis of calculation
Extra payments included in basis of calculation

Panel B: Industry-Specific Collective Bargaining Regulations
Group I

10/1996–12/1998
(2)

Since 1/1999
(3)

80% sick pay
Waiting period 4 weeks
Paid overtime included in basis of calculation
Extra payments can be contractually excluded
No cut if 1 day of paid vacation traded for 5 sick days

100% sick pay
Waiting period 4 weeks
Paid overtime excluded in basis of calculation
Extra payments can be contractually excluded

80% sick pay during first 3 days (eff. July 1, 1997)

Group II

100% sick pay
Paid overtime excluded in basis of calculation

Group III

100% sick pay

Panel C: Combined Effect for Different Industries
Group I
as in Panel A

80% sick pay, since 07/’97 during first 3 days
Waiting period 4 weeks

100% sick pay
Waiting period 4 weeks
Paid overtime excluded in basis of calculation

Group II

as in Panel A

100% sick pay
Waiting period 4 weeks
Paid overtime excluded in basis of calculation

100% sick pay
Waiting period 4 weeks
Paid overtime excluded in basis of calculation

Group III

as in Panel A

100% sick pay
Waiting period 4 weeks

100% sick pay
Waiting period 4 weeks
Paid overtime excluded in basis of calculation

NOTE: Group I is composed of the construction sector. Group II contains the following industries: steel, textile, mechanical engineering, automobile, ship and aerospace, electrical
engineering and optics, wood and paper, printing, food and hospitality, trade, banking and insurance. Group III represents the chemical, oil, glass, energy and water, postal and
transportation as well as public administration sector. Changes in regulation between time periods are in bold. The negotiated agreements cover 1.1M employees in Group I and at
least 4.5M in Group II and 4M in Group III (Jahn 1998; Hans Böckler Stiftung 2014).
SOURCE: Hans Böckler Stiftung (2014), own illustration.

Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics of Sick Leave Measures

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

Total sick cases per 100 enrollees
Total log(cases)

122.3
4.80

11.5
0.1

90.3
4.50

162.8
5.09

198
198

Infectious sick cases per 100 enrollees
Infectious log(cases)

8.2
2.07

2.2
0.29

3.9
1.36

14.9
2.70

198
198

Respiratory sick cases per 100 enrollees
Respiratory log(cases)

35.4
3.56

4.3
0.12

25.2
3.23

50.0
3.91

198
198

Digestive sick cases per 100 enrollees
Digestive log(cases)

16.3
2.79

2.0
0.12

12.8
2.55

24.0
3.18

198
198

Musculoskeletal sick cases per 100 enrollees
Musculoskeletal log(cases)

22.7
3.10

4.9
0.24

9.8
2.28

34.4
3.54

198
198

Injury sick cases per 100 enrollees
Injury log(cases)

12.7
2.51

3.2
0.25

6.8
1.92

23.5
3.16

198
198

NOTE: Descriptives are weighted by the annual number of industry-specific sickness fund enrollees.
SOURCE: BKK (2004), own calculations and illustration.
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Table A.3 Number of Enrollees per Industry and Treatment Group

Industry and Classification

Mean

Std. Dev.

Group I
Construction

127,642

104,205

Group II
Steel
Textile
Mechanical Engineering
Automobile
Ship and Aerospace
Electrical engineering, optics
Wood and Paper
Printing
Food and Hospitality
Trade
Banking and Insurance

109,397
32,367
191,391
301,725
33,626
306,296
57,070
38,477
55,045
341,566
149,188

7,405
7,854
44,035
43,313
9,323
71,383
27,307
19,605
33,748
227,279
74,095

Group III
Chemical
Oil
Glass
Energy and Water
Postal and Transportation
Public Administration

230,382
15,586
34,097
50,702
478,490
732,958

46,215
5,074
5,480
13,149
104,031
476,804

SOURCE: Bundesverband der Betriebskrankenkassen (BKK) (2004), own calculation and illustration.
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Table A.4 Effect of Changes in Sick Pay on Normalized Cases of Sick Leave—Pooled Regressions

Group I×’97-’98
Group I×’99-’04
Group II×’97-’98
Group II×’99-’04

(1)
Musculoskeletal

(2)
Musculoskeletal,
Infectious

(3)
Muscul., Infect.
Respiratory

-0.341***
(0.076)
-0.150
(0.157)
-0.038
(0.086)
0.131
(0.164)

-0.341***
(0.075)
-0.150
(0.155)
-0.038
(0.085)
0.131
(0.161)

-0.341***
(0.075)
-0.150
(0.154)
-0.038
(0.085)
0.131
(0.161)

0.193**
(0.088)
0.075
(0.164)
-0.003
(0.112)
-0.079
(0.176)

0.193**
(0.088)
0.075
(0.163)
-0.003
(0.111)
-0.079
(0.175)

Group I×’97-’98×Infectious
Group I×’99-’04×Infectious
Group II×’97-’98×Infectious
Group II×’99-’04×Infectious

Group I×’97-’98×Respiratory

0.133
(0.092)
0.019
(0.160)
0.016
(0.104)
-0.115
(0.170)
594
0.989

Group I×’99-’04×Respiratory
Group II×’97-’98×Respiratory
Group II×’99-’04×Respiratory

Observations
198
396
R2
0.858
0.982
NOTE: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the industry-diseaselevel. All regressions are weighted by the annual number of industry-specific sickness fund enrollees. The
descriptive statistics are in the Appendix (Table A.2). The regressions are based on equation 17. The model in
the first column equals the fifth column of Table 1. The model in the second column pools the two categories
musculoskeletal and infectious, where musculoskeletal form the reference group. The third column additionally adds respiratory diseases. The fourth column adds all other diseases as a separate category. All regressions
are estimated by OLS and include industry, disease and year fixed effects. The dependent variables are logarithms of the normalized sick leave cases per 100 employees. For more information on how the variables were
generated, see Section . Treated is a treatment indicator with one for Group I and zero for Group III, whereas
PartlyTreated is one for Group II and zero for Group III. Group I experienced a sick pay cut from 100 to 80%
in 1997 and a reversal in 1999. Group II experienced a soft cut in 1997 and Group III experienced a soft cut in
1999. For more information about the sick pay reforms, see Table A.1.
SOURCE: Bundesverband der Betriebskrankenkassen (BKK) (2004), own calculation and illustration;

47

Appendix B
Table B.1 Overview of Employer Sick Pay Mandates in the U.S.
Region
(1)

Law Passed
(2)

Law Effective
(3)

Content
(4)

San Francisco, CA

Nov 7, 2006

Feb 5, 2007

all employees including part-time and temporary; 1 hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours worked;
up to 5 to 9 days depending on firm size; for own sickness or family member; 90 days accrual period

Washington, DC

May 13, 2008

Nov 13, 2008

Dec 18, 2013
(extension pending funding)

Feb 22, 2014
(retrospective in Sep 2014)

’qualified employees’; 1 hour of paid sick leave for every 43 hours, 90 days accrual period;
up to 3 to 9 days depend. on firm size; own sickness or family; no health care or restaurant workers
extension to 20,000 temporary workers and tipped employees

Connecticut

July 1, 2011

Jan 1, 2012

full-time service sector employees in firms>49 employees (20% of workforce); 1 hour for every 40 hours;
up to 5 days; own sickness or family member, 680 hours accrual period (4 months)

Seattle, WA

Sep 12, 2011

Sep 1, 2012

all employees in firms with >4 full-time employees; 1 hour for every 30 or 40 hours worked;
up to 5 to 13 days depending on firm size, for own sickness or family member; 180 days accrual period

New York, NY

June 26, 2013
Jan 17, 2014 extended

April 1, 2014
(pending economy)

employees w >80 hours p.a in firms >4 employees or 1 domestic worker; 1 hour for every 30 hours;
up to 40 hours; own sickness or family member; 120 days accrual period

Portland, OR

March 13, 2013

Jan 1 2014

employees w >250 hours p.a. in firms >5 employees; 1 hour for every 30 hours;
up to 40 hours; own sickness or family member

Newark, NJ

Jan 29, 2014

May 29, 2014

all employees in private companies; 1 hour of for every 30 hours; 90 days accrual period;
up to 24 to 40 hours depending on size; own sickness or family

Philadelphia, PA

Feb 12, 2015

May 13, 2015

employees in firms >9 employees; 1 hour of paid sick leave for every 40 hours; 90 days accrual period;
up to 40 hours; own sickness or family member

California

September 19, 2014

July 1, 2015

all employees; 1 hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours; 90 days accrual period;
minimum 24 hours; own sickness or family member

Massachusetts

Nov 4, 2014

July 1, 2015

employees in firms >10 employees; 1 hour of paid sick leave for every 40 hours; 90 days accrual period;
up to 40 hours; own sickness or family member

Oakland, CA

Nov 4, 2014

March 2, 2015

employees in firms >9 employees; 1 hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours; 90 days accrual period;
up to 40 to 72 hours depending on firm size; own sickness or family member

Oregon

June 22, 2015

Jan 1, 2016

employees in firms >9 employees; 1 hour of paid sick leave for every 30 hours; 90 days accrual period;
up to 40 hours; own sickness or family member

SOURCE: several sources, own collection, own illustration.

Table B.2 U.S. Cities and States (in alphabetical order) with Weekly Google Flu Data As Of
City

Month

Day

Year

City

Month

Day

Year

State

Month

Day

Albany, NY
9
28 2003
Mesa, AZ
11
7 2004
Alabama
28
Albuquerque, NM
10
12 2003
Miami, FL
9
28 2003
Alaska
12
Anchorage, AK
10
17 2004
Milwaukee, WI
9
28 2003
Arizona
28
Arlington, VA
9
28 2003
Nashville, TN
9
28 2003
Arkansas
7
Atlanta, GA
9
28 2003
New York, NY
9
28 2003
California
28
Austin, TX
9
28 2003
Newark, NJ
9
28 2003
Colorado
28
Baltimore, MD
9
28 2003
Norfolk, VA
9
28 2003
Connecticut
28
Baton Rouge, LA
9
26 2004
Oakland, CA
9
28 2003
Delaware
30
Beaverton, OR
12
14 2003
Oklahoma City, OK
9
28 2003
District of Columbia
28
Bellevue, WA
11
30 2003
Omaha, NE
9
28 2003
Florida
28
Berkeley, CA
9
19 2004
Orlando, FL
9
28 2003
Georgia
28
Philadelphia, PA
9
28 2003
Hawaii
2
Birmingham, AL
9
28 2003
Boise, ID
10
3 2004
Phoenix, AZ
9
28 2003
Idaho
14
Boston, MA
9
28 2003
Pittsburgh, PA
9
28 2003
Illinois
28
Buffalo, NY
10
19 2003
Plano, TX
10
16 2005
Indiana
28
Cary, NC
9
26 2004
Portland, OR
9
28 2003
Iowa
28
Charlotte, NC
9
28 2003
Providence, RI
10
17 2004
Kansas
28
Raleigh, NC
9
28 2003
Kentucky
28
Chicago, IL
9
28 2003
Cleveland, OH
9
28 2003
Reno, NV
10
24 2004
Louisiana
28
Colorado Springs, CO
9
19 2004
Reston, VA
11
28 2004
Maine
31
Columbia, SC
10
10 2004
Richmond, VA
9
28 2003
Maryland
28
Rochester, NY
9
28 2003
Massachusetts
28
Columbus, OH
9
28 2003
Dallas, TX
9
28 2003
Roswell, GA
11
23 2003
Michigan
28
Dayton, OH
11
23 2003
Sacramento, CA
9
28 2003
Minnesota
28
Denver, CO
9
28 2003
Salt Lake City, UT
9
28 2003
Mississippi
28
Des Moines, IA
10
17 2004
San Antonio, TX
9
28 2003
Missouri
28
Durham, NC
9
28 2003
San Diego, CA
9
28 2003
Montana
27
Eugene, OR
10
17 2004
San Francisco, CA
9
28 2003
Nebraska
9
Fresno, CA
12
7 2003
San Jose, CA
9
28 2003
Nevada
23
Ft Worth, TX
10
3 2004
Santa Clara, CA
9
28 2003
New Hampshire
30
Gainesville, FL
10
12 2003
Scottsdale, AZ
10
24 2004
New Jersey
28
Grand Rapids, MI
10
3 2004
Seattle, WA
9
28 2003
New Mexico
17
Somerville, MA
9
28 2003
New York
28
Greensboro, NC
11
14 2004
Greenville, SC
10
24 2004
Spokane, WA
1
16 2005
North Carolina
28
Springfield, MO
10
30 2005
North Dakota
12
Honolulu, HI
9
28 2003
Houston, TX
9
28 2003
St Louis, MO
9
28 2003
Ohio
28
St Paul, MN
9
28 2003
Oklahoma
28
Indianapolis, IN
9
28 2003
Irvine, CA
10
3 2004
State College, PA
9
5 2004
Oregon
28
Irving, TX
9
28 2003
Sunnyvale, CA
9
28 2003
Pennsylvania
28
Jackson, MS
11
14 2004
Tampa, FL
9
28 2003
Rhode Island
24
Jacksonville, FL
10
3 2004
Tempe, AZ
9
28 2003
South Carolina
28
Kansas City, MO
9
28 2003
Tucson, AZ
9
28 2003
South Dakota
5
Knoxville, TN
10
3 2004
Tulsa, OK
9
28 2003
Tennessee
28
Washington, DC
9
28 2003
Texas
28
Las Vegas, NV
9
28 2003
Wichita, KS
9
26 2004
Utah
9
Lexington, KY
9
26 2004
Lincoln, NE
10
31 2004
Vermont
30
Little Rock, AR
10
3 2004
Virginia
28
Los Angeles, CA
9
28 2003
Washington
28
Lubbock, TX
10
17 2004
West Virginia
21
Madison, WI
9
28 2003
Wisconsin
28
Memphis, TN
10
24 2004
Wyoming
2
NOTE: The table indicates the first observation period and all cities (Sample I) and states (Sample II) included. The last observation
period is July 26, 2015 for the whole sample.
SOURCE: Google (2015), own collection, own illustration.
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9
12
9
11
9
9
9
10
9
9
9
11
11
9
9
9
9
9
9
10
9
9
9
9
11
9
11
11
11
11
9
10
9
9
11
9
9
9
9
10
9
11
9
9
11
10
9
9
11
9
12

Year
2003
2004
2003
2004
2003
2003
2003
2005
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004
2003
2005
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004
2003
2003
2006
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004
2003
2006
2003
2003
2003
2005
2003
2003
2004
2003
2007

